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Abstract 
The term ‘precautionary logic’ denotes a kind of argumentation that urges us 
to take far-reaching preventative measures. This form of argumentation 
appeals to a number of presuppositions about society, the environment, and 
human behaviour. Precautionary logic appeals to a sense of fragility of 
humankind and the environment, the uncertainty of scientific knowledge, the 
destructive tendencies of technology, the responsibility we have toward each 
other and towards future generations, and to the possibility of averting 
environmental catastrophe by adopting the wisdom of precaution as a guide. 
In its outlook, precautionary logic shares assumptions with early and 
mediaeval Christian thought. It argues for a restoration and maintenance of 
harmony between humankind and that which sustains it. In mediaeval times, 
this sustaining power was God; in secular times, it is nature itself, or the 
ecosystem. Adoption of this paradigm of harmony and precaution leads to a 
politics of moderation in which all behaviour seen as excessive, immodest, 
or risky should be curtailed.    
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1 Precautionary logic and a politics of moderation 
Multiple authors use the term ‘precautionary logic’ to characterise a way of 
thinking they see gaining ground in various domains of late modern culture. 
For the French thinker François Ewald, precautionary logic indicates a 
paradigm shift regarding the use of science in risk regulation.1 The term is used 
by Ewald for a kind of reasoning that urges us to look for doubt instead of 
certainty. According to precautionary logic, Ewald claims, we should always 
consider that an unseen threat may always lie in wait. We should use science 
not only to learn how to master perceived threats but also to uncover those we 
cannot perceive.  I must act ‘… as if Descartes’ malicious demon could have 
slipped into the folds of an apparently innocent enterprise’.2 For Ewald, 
precautionary logic concerns a way of using scientific knowledge in order to 
cast doubt on its own advances and to instil a mistrusting mentality within 
society.   
Prominent criminologist Richard Ericson considers that precautionary 
logic is applicable to the domain of security and crime.3 He quotes Ewald 
extensively but examines the importance of precautionary logic for security 
politics. 
Both authors argue that a kind of reasoning is gaining ground that 
urges us to take preventative measures to avoid the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of technological and security risks. In the field security policy, 
precautionary arguments were used to justify the US-led war on terror. 
According to Ericson, political rhetoric was used to ‘make precautionary logic 
a part of everyday life’. The public was prepared for a precautionary war by 
then Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice. She declared that extraordinary 
military mobilisation against terrorism was needed before ‘The smoking gun 
becomes a mushroom cloud’.4 A more elaborate argument in favour of the 
precautionary invasion in Iraq in order to prevent Saddam’s regime from 
keeping or acquiring weapons of mass destruction is given by Slaughter and 
Feinstein:  
The unprecedented threat posed by terrorists and rogue states armed with weapons of 
mass destruction cannot be handled by an outdated and poorly enforced 
nonproliferation regime. The international community has a duty to prevent security 
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 F. Ewald, ‘The return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: An Outline of a 
Philosophy of Precaution’ in T. Baker and J. Simon (eds.) Embracing Risk, the 
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disasters as well as humanitarian ones − even at the price of violating sovereignty.5  
In the domain of environmental risk regulation, precautionary logic may be 
even more firmly entrenched than in security policy. In this domain it has been 
legally sanctioned by the precautionary principle. This principle holds that 
when there is a threat of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
evidence may not be used as a reason not to take preventative measures. This 
principle has gained a key status in environmental law and is listed in the EC 
Treaty, among others. According to some scholars, the principle has the status 
of customary international environmental law.6 Concrete examples of 
precautionary reasoning in the domain of environmental and public safety can 
be found in recent policy documents as well as in the literature. For example, 
the Dutch Scientific council for Government Policy wrote in a recent report on 
physical security that they consider the precautionary principle implies that ‘the 
vulnerability of people, society, and the natural environment demands a 
proactive engagement with insecurity’.7  
In the literature regarding technological risk, a new way of dealing 
with these risks is sometimes advocated in strong terms. Paul van Loon writes:  
If we are to avoid a full-blown and catastrophic apocalypse, we have to engage with 
technology differently. Faith in reason is not a good starting point, reason in faith might 
be.8  
A similar albeit less extreme point was made by Poul Harremoës in his report 
Late lessons from early warnings. This report was written as a defence for a 
precautionary approach by listing a number of scientific ‘advances’ that turned 
out to be harmful to the environment or to public health. He writes:  
Knowing enough and acting wisely enough, across the full range of environmental and 
related health issues seems daunting. The interconnections between issues, the pace of 
technological change, our limited understanding and the ‘time to harm and then to heal’ 
of the ecological and biological systems that can be perturbed over decades by our 
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 L. Feinstein and A.M. Slaughter, ‘A duty to prevent’ (2004) 83 Foreign affairs, 
summary available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101faessay83113/lee-
feinstein-anne-marie-slaughter/a-duty-to-prevent.html> (accessed 2 February 2009). 
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(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2008) at 18. The import of this statement 
will be analysed on page 263 below. 
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 J. van Loon, Risk and Technological Culture: Towards a Sociology of Virulence
(London, New York: Routledge 2002) at 205.  
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technologies together present an unforgiving context.9
The examples above are all instances of precautionary arguments. They defend 
taking far-reaching preventative measures in order to curb an environmental or 
security threat of which we know little, but of which the consequences are 
portrayed as grave, often apocalyptic in scope. As will be elaborated further 
here, the curbing of these threats is often seen as demanding from us a thorough 
revision of our existing political, scientific, and institutional arrangements. Our 
current understanding is seen as too limited and often even portrayed as an 
accomplice to environmental degradation.  
Inspired by Ewald’s suggestion that these kinds of precautionary 
arguments indicate a paradigm shift in our dealing with risk, I wish to conduct a 
conceptual investigation into the notion of precautionary logic. By examining 
this notion, I aim to excavate assumptions that are implied in this kind of 
reasoning with regard to humans, their life-world, and the value of human 
knowledge. I will first review what the term ‘precautionary logic’ means. In 
what way can we speak of a ‘logic’ underlying the notion of precaution? I will 
then review a number of characteristic arguments put forth by advocates of 
precaution. These arguments are analysed to show what implicit and explicit 
presuppositions about ourselves and about nature lie at their base. In the final 
paragraphs of this article, I will conclude that precautionary logic as a paradigm 
of thought shares motives with an earlier religious paradigm. The paradigm of 
precaution uses language closely linked to the themes of apocalypse and 
salvation found in early millenarian Christianity. 
These motives are most tellingly displayed by Al Gore in his Address 
to the Climate Conference in Bali in 2007. In this speech, Gore rhetorically 
offers us two alternatives: one is to live in a world beset by floods and droughts, 
while the other is to be among the chosen few who have managed to inspire 
humankind to see itself as a ‘single global civilisation’. Gore presents two 
scenarios. In the first, we are confronted by our offspring who accuse us of 
having looked the other way and ignored the droughts and floods caused by 
global warming. With the necessary pathos, a picture is painted of crops drying 
up, ice caps melting, and deserts growing. In the second, our offspring look up 
to us admiringly because we have managed to organise ourselves and to fight 
hand-in-hand for a common cause. He does not hesitate to imply that this is a 
role to be played by only a chosen few who will influence the destiny of us all:  
I want you to tell them that you saw it as a privilege to be alive at a moment when a 
relatively small group of people could control the destiny of all generations to come.10
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Principle 1896- 2000 (Copenhagen: EEA 2001) at 4. 
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I consider this existential choice Gore presents us to be the most emblematic 
articulation of the ecological and precautionary worldview. This view envisions 
humankind as doomed to self-destruction unless it finds a new way to live in 
harmony with nature and with each other. The Christian ‘covenant with God’ 
has been replaced with a covenant with nature. To reach a harmonious 
relationship with nature, humans need to live moderate lives and also to 
moderate the ecosystems they are a part of, using the wisdom of precaution. To 
conclude, I will indicate how the advance of precautionary logic in various 
domains might influence policies relating to the environment, to safety, and to 
lifestyle choices. The religious elements in precautionary logic will lead to a 
policy in which there will be a stronger role for moralism and modesty. I refer 
to this kind of politics as a politics of moderation.       
2 Precautionary logic as an economy of truth 
This issue of Erasmus Law Review is devoted to precautionary logic. This 
implies that there must be at least a common understanding of what 
precautionary logic means. It is, however, not immediately obvious in what 
sense the term ‘logic’ is being used here. The same question may arise in regard 
to the logic of capitalism or ecological logic, for instance.11 In what sense do 
we use ‘logic’ in these terms? 
When logic is mentioned, it is usually in the context of formal logic, 
which concerns the principles of valid inference.12 In other words, logic is 
about the form of arguments and not about their content. This  brings us no 
further with regard to the question of what makes precautionary logic a type of 
logic. Precautionary logic certainly is not about the form of arguments, but 
about the content.   
In antiquity and in the Middle Ages, next to formal logic another 
branch of logic was widely studied. It was called material logic or major logic. 
The French philosopher Jacques Maritain gave the following definition:  
Major logic (or material logic) studies the material conditions of the science, and 
analyzes or resolves reasoning into the principles on which they depend for their 
material or in other words their content; it shows to which conditions the materials of 
the reasoning should respond such that it has a conclusion certain at every point, not 
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 The term ‘ecological logic’ was coined by Anna Bramwell when discussing the 
work of a number of vanguard ecologists. A. Bramwell, The Fading of the Greens: 
the Decline of Environmental Politics in the West (New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press 1994). The logic of capitalism is also a phrase routinely used: for 
instance, in the title of the book The Nature and Logic of Capitalism by Robert L. 
Heilbroner (London, New York: Norton 1986).   
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 W. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon press 
1984) at 1.  
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only from form, but also from the material - that is, a certain and true conclusion.13
This does point us in the right direction. Precautionary logic is a logic in this 
material sense. It is a set of principles that lead to arguments accepted as valid 
in the domains in which precautionary logic has established itself.  
Nevertheless, though precautionary logic is a logic in a material sense 
because it deals with content, there are also differences. In antiquity and in the 
Middle Ages, the luminaries studying material logic tried to incorporate 
principles that were universally valid. Material logic tried to provide true 
premises that would be valid for all time and could hence serve as a base for 
reasoning. Today, philosophy has largely given up on this enterprise. 
Especially in the social sciences it is now commonly held that even principles 
we consider true are restricted to a certain time place and are tied to the 
institutions and practices of society. To take these cultural horizons of even our 
most cherished concepts into consideration, Foucault coined the term ‘economy 
of truth’.  
The political economy of truth determines what kind of discourses are considered true, 
what the mechanisms and sanctions are to distinguish true from false, the techniques for 
acquiring truth and the status of those who are empowered to say what is true.14
  
In Foucauldian terms, precautionary logic is part of an economy of truth. It is 
the part that determines which discourses are considered true within a certain 
domain.15 By this I mean that precautionary logic has a number of criteria or 
presuppositions that determine the validity and truth of an argument advanced 
in the domain of environmental risk regulation. In other words, statements are 
considered true within precautionary logic because they appeal to certain 
presuppositions that are implicitly considered true by proponents of 
precautionary thinking. I use the term ‘presuppositions’ in the same way the 
British philosopher R.G. Collingwood uses ‘absolute presuppositions’. 
According to Collingwood, absolute presuppositions are ones in a certain 
domain that are considered true and not put into question: ‘an absolute 
presupposition functions as a presupposition of all questions it is related to, but 
never as an answer’. Hence the idea of verifiability is not applicable here: not 
because we would not like to verify these presuppositions but simply because 
they are not put into question. They are presupposed to be true and function as 
such in the domain in question. They function as a set of mutually interrelating 
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presuppositions, underpinning certain arguments made within that domain.  
The question is to what axioms and presuppositions should arguments 
appeal in order to be considered valid in precautionary logic. Since they are the 
presuppositions on which precautionary arguments are based, it must be 
possible to uncover them in precautionary reasoning, regardless of the specific 
context of the argument. According to Collingwood, a metaphysical analysis 
should unearth these kinds of presuppositions. I conduct here a similar analysis 
regarding the presuppositions made in precautionary logic.16  
To that end, I will examine a number of precautionary arguments in 
order to question what presuppositions concerning human nature, our life-
world, and our ability to make judgments about it are implicitly or explicitly 
stated to make those arguments convincing.  
3 The precautionary economy of truth: vulnerability and uncertainty 
For our analysis, it is important to examine precautionary logic in the domain in 
which its dominance is least contested. Since precautionary logic is most 
strongly established in our dealing with technological and environmental risk, it 
seems prudent to start our investigation of key-concepts and presuppositions of 
precautionary logic there. The imperative associated with the precautionary 
principle is a prima facie plausible candidate to start. The precautionary 
principle is the most visible political exponent of precautionary logic, because it 
has been taken up in international environmental law.17 Furthermore, Ewald 
also takes the precautionary principle as his point of departure when discussing 
the paradigm shift of risk regulation.18
The precautionary principle is itself not an absolute presupposition, but 
is a policy based on such presuppositions. The precautionary principle is the 
legal translation of the maxim that prevention is better than curing afterwards.19
Or, as Pieterman phrases it, the moral imperative of the precautionary culture is 
‘first do no harm’.20   
Perhaps the most well-known definition of the Precautionary Principle 
is found in article 15 of the Rio Declaration. It states:  
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 R.G. Collingwood, An essay concerning metaphysics- part 1 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1940) translated as: “Over metaphysica” by G. Vanheeswijck (Kampen: Kok 
Agora 1996) at 16. Collingwood’s conception of metaphysics is very different from 
a classical conception of the term. He considers metaphysics to be the science that 
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 Trouwborst, above n. 6, at 286. 
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 Ewald, above n. 1, at 274. 
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20 Id., at 64.  
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Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environment, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation 
(Climate Convention Rio de Janeiro 1992). The precautionary principle is a 
guideline for what to do in the case of uncertainty. This makes our relation to 
uncertainty a crucial component in the economy of truth in precautionary logic. 
We see a fearful position in regard to uncertainty. The underlying message of 
the precautionary principle is that protective measures should be taken, because 
we are vulnerable in the face of disaster and we have no sure way of predicting 
whether one will occur.  
An analysis of the precautionary principle reveals two assumptions at 
the core of precautionary logic. Firstly, it emphasises the ease with which 
things can go wrong. Humankind is vulnerable because there is a great 
potential for catastrophe.  
If one believes that catastrophic events are highly unlikely, we would 
not need this principle. It is because we do fear catastrophe and we believe we 
are vulnerable that we have such a broad public consensus to implement the 
precautionary principle. At least in Europe we seem to have this consensus.21  
In the Netherlands, an influential think-tank has recently argued its strong 
support for this principle. The Dutch Scientific Council for Governmental 
Policy (WRR) pleaded in their report to embrace the precautionary principle in 
administrative legislation, in the Civil Code and in the Constitution. The 
motivation of the Council was summarised in the statement: ‘The vulnerability 
of people, society and the natural environment demands a proactive 
engagement with insecurity’.22 This statement is paradigmatic for the line of 
argumentation employed in the report.23 It is deemed true by proponents of 
precaution, but demands assent to a number of presuppositions, two of which 
are explicitly stated here: vulnerability and insecurity. These presuppositions 
are part and parcel of the truth economy of precautionary logic.  
The WRR speaks about the vulnerability of people, society, and the 
natural environment. That vulnerability is the implied rationale for the 
precautionary principle. We, our institutions, and the world at large are 
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 Internationally there is no consensus as yet on the precautionary principle. David 
Vogel shows that a shift has taken place from US to Europe in regard to 
precautionary legislation. The US tended to be more precautionary in the 1970s and 
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shift considering risk policy. In the report they are mentioned numerous times.   
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vulnerable. This vulnerability is itself never contested, it is simply presupposed. 
It has to be presupposed, because if we consider ourselves, our ecosystems, and 
the earth on which we dwell to be robust, and correspondingly the chance of 
catastrophe extremely small, we would not need this principle. In pleas for 
precaution, our limited resources in the face of disaster are always stressed.24  
Arguments that we are indeed more vulnerable today in the face of 
technological catastrophe than we were in the face of natural dangers in the past 
are not given. They would also be very hard to give. How do we measure the 
increased risk of technological disaster versus the decreased risks of natural 
disaster? That no arguments are given and that questioning these 
presuppositions is often met with an angry response is an indication that we are 
dealing with absolute presuppositions.25
Secondly, the analysis reveals the presumption that uncertainty is 
somehow on the rise. Proponents of precaution defend the idea that decisions 
made today are much more plagued by uncertainty than were decisions in the 
past. In fact, ‘uncertainty’ has become a buzz word in our dealing with risk. 
The idea is that in a globalised and highly technological world, uncertainty is 
evidently more present than in simple former societies. I do not find this notion 
self-evident, however, for two reasons. The first is that we know decisions in 
the past had far-reaching consequences for our current society: for instance, the 
decision to develop the steam engine and not take precautionary measures 
regarding its applications altered our culture profoundly.26 The decision to 
develop the steam engine was at the time plagued by an equal amount of 
uncertainty just as the introduction of nanotechnology is today. The second 
reason is that even if it were granted that decisions today are taken in a more 
complex world, we still cannot conclude that their consequences are more 
uncertain and less easily predictable. The complexity of the world has 
increased, but so have our instruments for predicting possible consequences. 
Our scientific knowledge has increased dramatically. We might well argue that 
decisions taken in the past were plagued by much more uncertainty, since a 
ruler had to contend with the unpredictable will of the gods, the influence of the 
stars, and contradictory advice from various soothsayers. In short, the idea that 
the world today is more complex and that correspondingly our decisions are 
beset by more uncertainty than they were in the past is a presupposition. It is 
accepted and unquestioned. This acceptance makes precautionary arguments 
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 For instance in A. Arcuri, Governing the risks of ultra hazardous activities
(Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam 2005). The same presupposition is made 
in ecological thinking, which is closely related to the rise of the precautionary 
principle; Pieterman, above n. 19, at 90.  
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 Collingwood, above n. 16, at 46. 
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 For a discussion of the way that past technological developments have changed 
our current society, see L. Marx, The Machine in the Garden (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2000, 2nd ed.). 
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plausible.  
4 The precautionary economy of truth: science and the unknown 
One reason the uncertainty assumption is readily accepted by advocates of 
precaution is that they would not yield to the aforementioned argument that we 
have many more instruments now to control complexity. In fact, one of the 
other axioms in precautionary logic is that science cannot be trusted to supply 
us with adequate answers in the domain of risk. As Jane Hunt states: ‘Implicit 
in most interpretations of the precautionary principle is the recognition that 
science cannot adequately predict the potential environmental consequences of 
human activities’.27 It remains implicit because it is presupposed that scientific 
answers are inadequate to provide proper management of risk. This 
presupposition does not seem to follow directly from the principle itself, but it 
is indeed implied. If it were easy to obtain scientific certainty, we could wait. It 
is the assumption that we cannot, at least not with regard to environmental 
questions, that makes the principal interesting for its proponents. In fact it is 
exactly for this reason that Joel Tickner and Carolyn Raffensperger embrace it. 
In their introduction Protecting Public Health, they put it as follows:  
Modern day problems that cover vast expanses of time and space are difficult to assess 
with existing scientific tools. Accordingly, we can never know with certainty whether a 
particular activity will cause harm. … With increasing knowledge about the 
complexities of ecosystems, the human body, and the impacts of various stressors, we 
have realized that we actually understand less than we thought we did about these 
systems.28   
We find this type of criticism of science all through environmental law, as Jean 
Marc Piret argues.29
The role of science is not exclusively negative within the economy of 
truth of precautionary logic. It is in fact somewhat ambivalent. There is a 
mistrust of traditional science and what is seen as its Cartesian paradigm. It is 
presupposed that science cannot provide adequate answers due to the 
complexity of environmental questions. It is argued that we need a more 
holistic science. Yet even ‘traditional’ science is fine when it teaches us 
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 Jane Hunt, ‘The Social Construction of Precaution’ in T. O’ Riordan and J. 
Cameron (eds.), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (London: Earthscan 1994) 
at 117.   
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 J. Raffensperger and C. Tickner, ‘To foresee and to forestall’ in J. Raffensperger 
and C. Tickner (eds.), Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Implementing 
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precaution. Raffensperger and Tickner denounce risk assessment as such, since 
it is tied in with the presuppositions of traditional science, but state:  
Risk assessment can play a role in implementing the precautionary principle. Instead of 
using risk assessment to establish ‘safe’ levels of exposure, levels that are 
fundamentally unknowable, it can be used to better understand the hazards of an 
activity and to compare options for prevention.30  
The same has been signalled by François Ewald. He contends that in 
precautionary logic, science is urged to continuously question the many proofs 
that everyday life should not be the subject of permanent anxiety. ‘In effect’, he 
concludes, ‘science interests us less by producing new knowledge than for 
introducing new doubts’.31 The same shift in the use of science has been 
emphasised by Frank Furedi in his article Precautionary Culture and the Rise 
of Possibilistic Risk Assessment for this issue of Erasmus Law Review. 
According to Furedi, environmentalist thinkers have been at the forefront of a 
movement to discredit probabilistic thinking about risk and to urge for 
possibilistic thinking, which invites speculation about all things that can 
possibly go wrong.32
 In practical public health and environmental politics, this trend that 
Ewald signals is already visible: for instance, in the valuation of air-pollution 
by particles. It is feared that tiny particles are a substantial cause of illness and 
even mortality. This category of pollutants is called particulate matter (PM) and 
is defined as every tiny particle or droplet that has a diameter of less than 10 
micrometres. However, it is still unclear what chemical composition a particle 
must have in order to be dangerous. The trend is to fear that the smaller a 
particle is, the more dangerous it becomes. Since the 10-micrometre particle 
appears not to be very dangerous, the 2.5-microgram particle must be the 
dangerous one. However, our measurement systems are becoming increasingly 
sensitive and we may now identify particles with a diameter of 1 micrometre 
and even of 0.1 micrometre. The smaller the particle becomes, the more 
difficult it is to measure, but the more fear and suspicion it instils. Voices are 
raised currently that tell us to fear in particular the 1 and 0.1 PM.33  
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 J. Raffensperger and C. Tickner, The Precautionary Principle in Action: A 
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Upon questioning this assumption, I was told that at a given moment 
the particle would be so utterly small that it would simply pass through all our 
cellular tissue without having any effect. I concluded that in that case the 
particle is reduced to nothing. It seems precaution stops when we are dealing 
with nothing, but even that is not quite true.  
In view of precaution, we cannot stop at the immeasurable. A relatively 
new characteristic of precautionary logic is the consideration of ‘unknown 
unknowns’. This gained a kind of notoriety when it was introduced to justify 
another instance of precautionary politics: namely, the pre-emptive strike 
doctrine of then US President George W. Bush. The then US Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld used it to denote that risks abound about which we are not 
even aware. In fact, the introduction of the concept won Rumsfeld a prize for 
most nonsensical comment.34 It is true that the concept of unknown unknowns 
is self-contradictory. It is a Catch-22-like concept, because we cannot know 
whether they are there, in what number, their relevance, or the extent to which 
they are indeed risky. In fact we cannot know anything about their existence 
and yet they are conceptualized. This is self-contradictory, because it is a 
concept conceptualising something that resists conceptualisation. There might 
be infinite unknown unknowns or none at all; they might be helpful or harmful 
unknown unknowns. It is of no consequence, because we cannot know either 
way. The comment might have won a prize and been ridiculed, but it has been 
picked up in ‘precaution speak’.35  
5 The precautionary economy of truth, time, space, responsibility, and 
wisdom  
Precautionary logic has a chronological dimension, as risks are potentialities 
that might become actual. Costs are actual and are felt now. Precaution argues 
for sacrificing benefits now in order not to be harmed in the future, and the 
relation with the future is one of anxiety. Because precaution is often concerned 
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with catastrophic damage that may potentially realise itself, it invites us to 
consider worst-case scenarios and to take into account even the smallest of 
risks.36 This extension into the future is in principle limitless, and has been 
made clear in the climate change debate. The EU considers that the scope of its 
policy must be one hundred years. It is also clear in Veerman’s analysis of the 
need for a new and very costly Delta plan for raising the Dutch dikes.37 Worst-
case scenarios are stacked together to argue for building precautionary dikes 
aimed at preventing a flood that might occur hundreds of years from now. I call 
this the ‘2 to 12 argument’. Precaution extends its scope well into the future, 
but the future is always considered one heartbeat away from being now. It is 
always ‘2 to 12’ and so measures need to be taken now; they can never wait.  
The farther that precaution is extended in time, the bigger the margin of 
uncertainty. Since precaution is applicable in instances of scientific uncertainty, 
these tendencies reinforce each other. Here the notion of uncertainty and the 
precautionary call for regulation of future events calls for precautionary politics 
on many terrains. This makes people, institutions, and policy-makers far more 
responsible. Not only are we responsible for our own well-being, which as we 
have seen is fragile enough, we are also made accountable for the well-being of 
future generations because of precaution’s chronological dimension.  In 
combination with the imperative to take into account worst-case scenarios and 
even unknown unknowns, we are faced with a daunting task. Ewald envisions 
that we should ‘out of precaution, imagine the worst possible, the consequence 
that an infinitely deceptive malicious demon could have slipped in the folds of 
an apparently innocent enterprise’.38  
Since risks do not stop at the border, our responsibility to be 
precautious has also expanded in space. Ulrich Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ has 
become a ‘World Risk Society’. Globalisation and temporalisation have caused 
the scope of our actions to be wider and deeper, and coupled with that our 
responsibilities as well. The following is summarised nicely in K. Whitesides’ 
notion of precaution. In his book Precautionary Politics, Whiteside writes:  
Precautionary politics means that we must take responsibility for maintaining the 
robustness of the intricately interconnected ecological systems that sustain life on this 
planet – even when we are far from understanding all the conditions that make them 
thrive. Never before has so much wisdom been required of humanity’s slowly 
advancing capacity for political association.39   
We are responsible even if we do not know. We must maintain the balance of 
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intricately woven systems against large odds. Wisdom is needed from us, 
whereas it is implied that this wisdom is something different from scientific 
knowledge.40 What strikes me here especially is the juxtaposition of the 
‘intricately interconnected ecological systems’ and ‘humanity’s slowly 
advancing capacity for political association’. While nature is portrayed as in 
itself an intricate and interconnected whole, humankind on the contrary is 
cumbersome and slow and we can only hope it will find wisdom.  
This appeal to the wisdom of foresight that extends well into the future 
is a characteristic presupposition of precautionary logic. It is simply assumed 
we are able to do this in a meaningful way. This is questionable.41 We do not 
know whether our technological advances will hurt or help future generations. 
Yet in precautionary logic it is assumed that we somehow can know and that 
we can judge beforehand what risks are likely and which should be avoided. 
We will never know by using conventional science, but we can by using 
wisdom.42 Typically, risks that have to do with modern technology should be 
avoided, and that takes us to the following point: the bleak view of humankind 
and its endeavours.  
6 The precautionary economy of truth, humans versus nature, humans 
versus humans 
The examples given in the last paragraphs indicate yet another reason that we 
are responsible. It is because the dangers we are facing and the uncertainties we 
are subjected to are considered to be of our own making. Our institutional 
arrangements have led us to the risk society, in which we have polluted air and 
water and are agents of war and terrorism. Arguments for precaution are never 
arguments to intervene with nature, because of the horrible things nature is 
prone to do. Precautionary arguments are arguments to intervene in cultural 
arrangements. No one raises a precautionary alarm at the thought of creating a 
large natural reserve in the Dutch Oostvaarders Plassen, even though letting 
nature take its course may cause drastic changes to the environment. For the 
threat, it does not matter whether it is man-made, but for precautionary 
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argumentation it seems to be important. Whether global warming is man-made 
has no impact on its reality, yet it is emphasised time and again that it should be 
considered man-made. In the air-pollution debate centred on particulate matter, 
people point to the risk of man-made particles, taking for granted that natural 
particles will cause no harm.43  
Humankind is seen as a polluting, destructive force, while nature is 
considered far less dangerous.44 Precautionary logic has a dualistic conception 
of humankind and nature: they are viewed as distinct entities. Arie 
Trouwborst’s definition of the precautionary principle highlights this dualism. 
He states that the core of the principle is ‘in dubio pro natura’.45 It implies that 
our actions can be contra or pro nature, but are never themselves natural.  
In the philosophies of thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke, a ‘state of 
nature’ still had an ominous ring to it. Nowadays nature is seen as benevolent, 
but things having to do with culture, or worse, ‘technological culture’, are 
received with anxiety. In Hobbes, the state of nature is the condition before the 
onset of law and the state. For ecologists, the state of nature is the state before 
the onset of technology. In Hobbes, the exploits of humans could lead them out 
of the state of nature and into a ‘commonwealth’. For the ecologist, the onset of 
technology has corrupted nature, perhaps irreversibly. The term taken from 
Whiteside’s work referred to above shows the same presupposed opposition 
between nature working like clockwork and humankind being cumbersome and 
brutish. The tendency to see humankind as inherently good, but the embrace of 
technology having led to a certain fall from grace, is current among many 
strands of ecologism, as Bramwell shows. In a thought-provoking study, Keith 
Thomas shows us how the advances of the industrial revolution triggered a 
kind of longing for the old pastoral ‘natural’ state.46 Before the industrial 
revolution, nature had no such pristine place in the public imagination. 
Nowadays though we are forced to live with a sense of guilt about having 
destroyed what once was. It seems that the farther we are removed from a state 
of nature, the more it is forgotten that living in such a state was ‘solitary, nasty, 
brutish and short’. 
The responsibility that precautionary logic places upon us to curb risk 
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does not extend solely to the environmental domain. We also become 
responsible for keeping each other and our society safe. The formulation of the 
Dutch Scientific Council once more comes to mind. A proactive engagement 
with security is needed. Paul Frissen noted that this made us all responsible for 
our environment as well as for state security.47 As the WRR formulates it:  
… That society takes on the obligation to take insecurity seriously and that she creates 
the conditions under which multiple actors – politics and science -  the administration as 
well as private parties – will be enabled to meet this obligation.  
In this domain too we see the reversal of Hobbesian reasoning. Hobbes’ 
solution was to place security squarely in the hands of the state, in order to 
escape from a state of nature. Here the opposite is being argued: civilians, 
corporations, and private parties should all be made responsible for security. At 
this juncture, the call is made to change present institutional arrangements. 
Here we leave precautionary logic and enter into precautionary politics.  
7 Precautionary logic and the truth economy of the Enlightenment 
Before venturing into politics, it would be constructive to review this outline of 
precautionary logic. I think the core has been mapped out. Precautionary 
arguments are considered true when they rest on the following basic 
assumptions: firstly, humankind and its environment are vulnerable. This is a 
given. Almost all precautionary arguments will display this presumption of 
vulnerability; secondly we are facing a world of intrinsic uncertainty. Science is 
unable to help us cope with the risks and does not make the weighing of risk 
possible. Science and technology are part of the problem and not part of its 
solution, unless they transform themselves, as Raffensperger and Tickner argue 
and Ewald signals; thirdly, human action is viewed with suspicion, since 
humans have a tendency to disrupt nature. Humankind and nature are viewed as 
distinct entities; fourthly, since humankind is destructive as well as fragile, we 
must take responsibility for each other and control disruptive people as well as 
disruptive things. A fifth characteristic of precautionary arguments is the 
implication that even though our current use of science and technology may 
well lead to disasters, we may avert them when we realise the necessity for 
wisdom. There is a way out, but it entails a significant alteration of our habits 
and our frame of mind. This new wisdom is the wisdom of precaution. 
To counter the threats we have ourselves created, we should resort to 
the wisdom of foresight. We are responsible for future generations and for the 
well-being of the planet and its ecosystems. We have the capability to 
transform our short-sighted self-interest into a long term holistic vision by 
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means of precaution. A new attitude of precaution and awareness of risk is seen 
as the light at the end of the tunnel.  
Do these presuppositions really present a new way of thinking about 
ourselves, and if so do they have any practical political consequences? The first 
part of the question should be answered with yes and no. It does mark a break 
from the older enlightenment values embraced in industrial society, but it is not 
an economy of truth that is unprecedented in the history of thought.  
The axioms of precautionary logic differ significantly from 
enlightenment values. A comparison of the axioms in both has already been 
undertaken by Roel Pieterman in his book on precautionary culture, and a part 
of it is covered in an article by Roel Pieterman and Tobias Arnoldussen.48 The 
differences between precautionary logic and the economy of truth of the 
enlightenment concern primarily four different but interdependent notions: the 
view of the autonomous human subject changed; the view of the possibility of 
knowledge changed; the view of our world as a robust entity changed; and the 
ideas concerning moral and technological progress changed. 
The Enlightenment faith in human progress has become a story of 
human degradation: instead of progress there is decline. Human history is 
portrayed as a process in which we increased insecurity and risk. Despite the 
fact that we live longer and lead healthier lives now than at any point in history, 
it is stated that risk, uncertainty, and insecurity have increased to unprecedented 
levels. The rationale behind it is that man-made catastrophes have become 
possible, and they have gradually become a focal point of our anxiety. 
Therefore, the idea of the human agent as a force of moral progress has been 
discarded. Furthermore, the autonomous subject of the enlightenment has been 
replaced by a fragile subject caught in the trappings of ecosystems. In fact, the 
whole idea of the autonomous human subject has lost its prominent place in 
thought. Precautionary logic takes a standpoint ‘sub specie aeternitate’, an 
absolute standpoint. The autonomous subject living in the here and now does 
not take the centre stage anymore, but the well-being of future generations 
does. Their well-being is bound up with that of of earth’s ecosystems, from bio-
diversity to climate.   
The narrative of progress is turned on its head. Even though 
humankind is bound to nature, it is also essentially alienated from it. Instead of 
being an agent of moral progress, humankind has strayed and this has brought it 
to the edge of a chasm into which it may fall sooner rather than later. Because 
of their short-sighted and destructive tendencies, humans should be watched by 
other humans and kept under surveillance. Autonomy is replaced by an 
emphasis on learning to be precautious. The Enlightenment faith in science has 
been replaced by a ‘crisis of the sciences’. The earth is no longer seen as a 
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potential to be domesticated and put to good use, but as a fragile balance that 
might easily shift the wrong way. The consequences of such a shift may well be 
disastrous for humanity.    
Acceptance of this inversion of all values leads to a different 
worldview and with it to different tactics to combat uncertainty. Authors such 
as Ulrich Beck point out that this change does not mean a fundamental 
departure from modernity but a radicalisation of its tendencies. The faith in 
reason that constitutes the ideal of the Enlightenment also means that 
everything, including its own concepts, will be criticised by reason. This is a 
plausible explanation for the turning away from values that the Enlightenment 
represented.  
The critical role that reason is supposed to play in the Enlightenment 
leads to a questioning of its own assumptions. Reason is granted the power of 
being the sole tribunal of knowledge and critique, and that trust in reason leads 
to its mistrust because criticism necessarily implies self- criticism. Indeed, we 
seem to have reached that reflective stage of self-criticism. Reason is granted 
absolute power of critique and the trust in its powers leads to despair.   
The same conversion into its opposite we find in the conception of 
vulnerability. At first glance it is surprising that vulnerability becomes 
axiomatic in a time when we have achieved so much technological mastery of 
the earth. At the same time, this mastery teaches us that what we took to be an 
indomitable force is not: it can yield. Therefore the security that this mastery is 
supposed to give us leads to the insecurity of finitude. Our environment can be 
destroyed. We have such power. This breeds a sense of uprootedness and 
fearful responsibility and leads to calls for restoration of a harmony that was 
supposedly there in our past. The idealisation of science as a means to protect 
us from nature has given way to an idealisation of nature as it was before the 
onset of technology.  
8 Precautionary logic and religion 
Have the axioms of the enlightenment indeed been turned into their opposite? 
When we compare the economy of truth that precautionary logic offers, we see 
similarities to an economy of truth that was firmly entrenched in the Middle 
Ages, in the philosophy of the church fathers, and in Christianity. This was 
indeed the economy of truth that Enlightenment originally set out to criticise.  
Whereas Enlightenment promised us a continuous era of progress, 
precautionary logic warns us that it is ‘2 to 12’. Since fragility is central to the 
self-understanding advanced by precautionary logic, every risk of disaster 
should be excluded. This is not possible, however. Therefore fragility 
combined with the other key notions of fundamental insecurity and mistrust of 
science results in an unsolvable anxiety. The set of presuppositions of 
precautionary logic fuels the idea that we are living in an end-time. We do not 
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live in a dawn of reason but in the end-time of technology. The ‘carpe diem’ of 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment has been replaced by a new ‘memento 
mori’. In his book Black Mass, John Gray describes a variety of political 
systems that ruled in the 20th and early 21st century as ‘apocalyptic’.49 Without 
glossing over important differences, this can be said to hold true for 
precautionary logic as well. Precautionary logic has an apocalyptic character. 
As we have seen, it obsesses about irreversible imbalances and human 
uncertainty in the face of catastrophe. The difference is that the apocalypse is 
not God’s doing, but that of humans. It is a secularised apocalyptic and 
eschatological logic in which the destroyer God and the saviour God have been 
replaced by nature as both destroyer and nurturer. 
Precautionary logic favours apocalyptic thinking, but it is also 
eschatological. Eschatology is the doctrine of salvation and this too is 
prominent in precautionary logic. We can be redeemed and we might be spared 
the catastrophe, but it does entail conversion. This conversion is constituted by 
embracing the demanded proactive engagement with insecurity. Even the 
language adopted is one of a call that needs to be answered, as in ‘the 
obligation to take insecurity seriously’, or ‘never before has so much wisdom 
been required of humanity….’. The same religious imagery is invoked by the 
disasters lying in wait when we do not heed the call. We need to contend with 
rising water levels, a new deluge; depletion of the ozone layer means we will be 
burned by the sun; not being as precautious as necessary towards our fellow 
humans will result in war or terror. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the 
icons of precautionary thinking, Al Gore, uses the language of catastrophe and 
salvation in his Bali speech. 
They'll look back, and either they will ask "What were you thinking? Didn't you hear 
the IPCC four times unanimously warning the world to act? Didn't you see the glaciers 
melting? Didn't you see the North Polar ice cap disappearing? Didn't you see the deserts 
growing, and the droughts deepening, and the crops drying up? Didn't you see the sea 
level rising? Didn't you see the floods? Didn't you pay attention to what was going on? 
Didn't you care? What were you thinking? 
Or they will ask a second question, one that I'd much prefer them to ask. I 
want them to look back on this time, and ask: ‘How did you find the moral courage to 
successfully address a crisis that so many said was impossible to address? How were 
you able to start the process that unleashed the moral imagination of humankind to see 
ourselves as a single, global civilization?’ And when they ask that question, I want you 
to tell them that you saw it as a privilege to be alive at a moment when a relatively 
small group of people could control the destiny of all generations to come.50
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The point of this speech is to offer an existential choice between a world beset 
by plagues of biblical proportions or graced with a hard-won salvation that will 
create a harmonious world in which we manage to balance risks using 
precaution and to restore the harmony of the earth’s ecosystems. This harmony 
is most of all a vision for the future, and is one between humans and nature, but 
especially between humans and their offspring. The choice is one of discord 
between us and future generations, or of harmony. The kingdom of harmony 
that should be realised by us will be a kingdom come for future generations. It 
is the ‘moral imagination of humankind to see ourselves as a single, global 
civilisation’. The biblical imagery is taken further by presenting the people 
fighting to address climate change as a small band of chosen ones. The destiny 
of the world lies in their hands. The ‘conversion’ to realise the change in the 
behaviour of humankind is not an easy one. It entails transforming our beliefs, 
our scientific methods, and our modes of production and consumption.51 It 
cannot be otherwise. We all carry the burden of the fall from grace, presented 
in precautionary logic as our wasteful and short-sighted, profit-minded human 
temperament.  
In mediaeval philosophy, humankind is tainted with original sin. The 
expulsion from the Garden of Eden happened when humans ate from the 
forbidden fruit of knowledge. The same ambiguous stance towards knowledge 
is found in precautionary logic as it is in religious doctrine: human knowledge 
is not to be trusted, but it may be ultimately beneficial when we utilise it for the 
love of God or nature respectively.52  
The relationship between humankind and nature has parallels with the 
relationship St. Augustine envisions between God and humans. In the same 
way that St. Augustine views God, nature is seen as a powerful but ultimately 
benevolent force. It is we humans who, due to a corrupted will that causes 
disruptions in our relationship with nature, will cause ultimate harm. The 
following paragraphs from a book on Augustinian political theory summarise 
the views of the bishop of Hippo, but could easily be found in the pleas of a 
proponent of precaution. 
Like all other created beings, man is good, but not incorruptibly, absolutely, or 
necessarily good. He is mutable and changeable, but as long as he acknowledges his 
dependence upon and his inferiority to God, his Creator and obeys his commands, he 
will be good and happy. Moreover man has been given the gift of free will, which no 
other earthly creature possesses, he can if he wishes to do so act in a manner contrary to 
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Gods command. He can choose to obey or disobey. If he disobeys he turns away from 
the source of his being, his life will be warped and stunted, the farther he removes 
himself from God, the more wretched, miserable and imperfect he will become.53  
From Carson to Gore, we see the same relationship between humans and their 
Creator as is envisioned here. The hallmark of precautionary logic is the belief 
that the more technological culture advances and the more humankind removes 
itself from nature, the more ‘wretched and miserable’ humankind and the 
environment will become. However, precautionary thinking is thoroughly 
secularised. The Creator does not live on another plane of existence. The 
dichotomy between creator and created is the same however. Here, nature is 
seen as the creator and humans and what is man-made are seen as having been 
created. Therefore it is less perfect, flawed, and dangerous. Nevertheless, if 
humankind uses its free will for the benefit of working with nature and not 
against it, a happy life may ensue. 
Augustine sees life as fraught with danger and hardships and inherently 
flawed because of original sin. However, faith may be an indication that one 
belongs to the chosen ones on which God has bestowed grace. The same role 
that faith plays for Augustine, wisdom plays for the precautionary.   
Human existence in this world is characterised by fragility and 
fragmentation. This fragility makes balance and harmony a necessary virtue, 
both within mediaeval thought and within precautionary logic. This harmony 
though is for the human of mediaeval times only to be found in the afterlife, 
where the multiplicity of things is made whole.  
The multiplicity and fragility of earthly things admits of no perfect condition; there is 
happiness only in another world, in which the multiplicity is made one and the fragility 
is exchanged for permanence.54  
The precautionary thinker has a similar vision of a holistic science that will 
restore harmony between humans and nature. Unlike the Augustinians, humans 
see this harmony as a possibility to be realised on this earth, and not for the 
here and now, but for tomorrow. The idea that this harmony lies in the future 
lives on in the conceptualisation of ‘future generations’ Gore envisions this 
utopian vision as follows:  
The greatest opportunity inherent in this climate crisis is not only to quickly deploy the 
new technologies that will facilitate sustainable development, and create the new jobs 
and to lift standards of living. The greatest opportunity is that in rising to meet the 
climate crisis, we in our generation will find the moral authority and capacity for long 
term vision to get our act together in this world and to take on these other crises, not 
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political problems, and solve them. We are one people on one planet. We have one 
future, one destiny. We must pursue it together, and we can.  
The picture of harmony painted by Gore resembles the harmony of the afterlife. 
Like the ‘City of God’, the future will be a time in which that which is 
fragmented and fraught with conflict becomes whole. The disruptions with 
which this world struggles will be solved and we will be re-united with each 
other and with the planet. Gore envisions the coming of an end-time in which 
our destiny is fulfilled. 
It is clear that the outline sketched here is not subtle enough. There are 
many great differences in the views of different mediaeval philosophers, 
especially between Thomas and Augustine. However, they have things in 
common as well, and they are important here. The philosophies of the Middle 
Ages were based on a perspective of harmony. Excess, hubris, and immodesty 
are from the time of Aristotle onward seen as upsetting the balance. Aristotle’s 
philosophy, on which Thomas’ thinking is based, as well as the neo-Platonic 
philosophies that informed St. Augustine, were philosophies of mediation and 
moderation. Humankind took an in-between position. He was more perfect than 
the rest of creation, due to his ability to reason and his desire for truth, but he 
was far more flawed than God. In comparison, the pretentious truths of 
Enlightenment are thoroughly immodest. They represent the human subject, 
autonomous, reasonable, calculating, as the source and measure of good and 
evil. Legislation was a matter of the will of the people, not the will of God. It is 
not a philosophy of mediation, in which the subject is the medium between 
God and the animals, heaven and earth. In Enlightenment philosophy, the 
human subject has occupied an absolute position. The liberal perspective of 
self-realisation, either individually or collectively, could become dominant 
because of this prioritisation of the subject. 
Augustine would consider this view to be ultimately sinful. Indeed, for 
him human pride led to the fall from grace. ‘By craving to be more, man 
becomes less; and by aspiring to be self sufficing he fell away from Him that 
truly suffices him’.55
The advocates of precaution could easily agree with the church father 
on this score. Precautionary logic represents a break with prideful 
Enlightenment philosophy. No longer can we calculate risks and judge which 
ones to take; we must be moderate in the face of uncertainty. The punishment 
for immodesty in this regard is catastrophe. Therefore we refer back to a role of 
medium. Now it is the ecosystem that sustains us and humankind is an 
imperfect beneficiary, though with the redeeming quality of foresight. This is 
our role in precautionary logic: becoming a happy medium, shepherd of 
ecosystems, keeper of sustainability, and living in harmony with ourselves, 
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other human beings, and nature.56
In short, the reflection of Enlightenment values has created a new 
despair and a new uncertainty. Enlightenment values became less convincing 
perhaps to radical moderns, because it is clear that we do not control our own 
destinies. We cannot calculate the dangers by using common sense; we need 
experts and expert systems. We do not know our ways about in the intricate 
systems of capital and management that we have created by ourselves. This 
uncertainty has caused a reappraisal of our own role within the greater scheme 
of things. The autonomous subject as such does not exist. Self-reflection has 
led us to the conclusion that we cannot take the place of the absolute subject 
and that we should once again resign ourselves to the role of medium.  
In order not to become resigned to powerlessness, we refer back to an 
older paradigm in which we were not all-powerful but could gain favour by 
sacrifice and modest living. This is what precaution asks from us: the sacrifice 
of consumption and production, a new modesty in the face of risk, and the 
establishment of harmony between our development and the demands of 
nature. The role of humankind in religious logic is similar to its role in 
precautionary logic. It is not after autonomy but seeks to maintain a 
harmonious relationship. In mediaeval times, this relationship was our covenant 
with God. In present times, it is that between humans and their environment.57
We should not disrupt the harmony between humans and nature. 
9 Precautionary politics and precautionary law 
What would the relevance of all of this be for politics in a risk society? It is 
known that politics is getting to be more risk averse, at least in Europe. It is also 
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known that green policy initiatives increasingly gain ground and are adopted by 
parties all across the political spectrum. However, risk aversion and even green 
politics might still be considered instrumental. If precautionary logic in fact 
displays a quasi-religious underpinning, risk aversion will be combined with 
other trends. Practical politics will display the ideals of harmony and 
moderation that follow from precautionary logic.  
Here I will sketch a preliminary outline of political developments 
based on the assumption that precautionary logic is indicative of a paradigm 
shift in favour of a secularised religious perspective of harmony between 
creator and created. This proposal could function as a base for further research 
questions. Politics following from precautionary logic will reflect the 
presuppositions embedded in this line of reasoning. It will take into account 
vulnerability, insecurity, a shift in the aim of science from disinterested 
knowledge to knowledge in the service of love of nature, enlarged 
responsibility, and fear of an end-time, but – at the same time – hope for a 
harmonious future. 
I would like to refer to the politics associated with this set of 
presuppositions as a politics of moderation. I use this term in the double 
meaning of the word ‘moderation’.58 Firstly, I use it in the common sense 
meaning linked to frugality. We have to be moderate in regard to resource and 
energy use, moderate in regard to our lifestyles, and moderate in regard to our 
expectations from science. Immodesty would upset the balance of harmony that 
proponents of precautionary logic implicitly or explicitly view as the core of 
our existence.  
Secondly, I will use the word in the sense of ‘avoiding extremes of 
behaviour or expression: observing reasonable limits’.59 Administrations, but 
also groups of civilians, will adopt the role of moderator in order to harmonise 
the smooth interplay of relationships and negotiations that shape politics within 
society. People and ideas that cannot be filtered out of the discourse in this way 
will be banned to the fringes of society.60 Moderation as a tool of politics 
amounts to tweaking unwanted elements in society. Moderation does not aim at 
rooting them out but at moderating their effects. Harmony is restored by 
targeted interventions, moderate in scope. Moderation in this view is the soft 
but definite and all-encompassing discipline that is used to force actors to be 
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moderate in their own life styles, their demands, and their use of resources. 
Moderation thus understood is coherent with the presuppositions of 
precautionary logic. Extremes threaten the harmony of the whole. This 
harmony is fragile and so a constant wariness of disruptions is in order. We do 
not know the effects of our measurements and so the best policy is to exclude 
possible forces of disruption. These forces may be excessive sexuality, 
excessive eating, anti-social behaviour, or product and process innovations, all 
the consequences of which we can not yet foresee. The morality of moderation 
is enforced by moderation as a policy instrument, a subtle exclusionary 
disciplining. 
What would this mean in concrete terms? It would entail a curbing of 
individual freedoms to increase the strength of the collective. It would also give 
more space to specifically moral policy initiatives. The diminishing importance 
of specific Enlightenment ideals of untrammelled subjectivity would give way 
to holistic, communitarian ethics. The collective is seen as fragile, however. 
Therefore the new initiatives would be idealistic, but with a certain 
conservative and cautious bend. Political initiatives would be aimed at reducing 
what is seen as disturbances of any kind. This would extend to the 
environmental domain. Here we would see a more restrictive approach to 
innovations in research and production. Standards of safety would be tightened, 
which would make innovations more costly to develop. This approach would 
lead to a more static society, with the exception perhaps of the development of 
technologies seen as being friendly to the environment. Investing money in 
‘sustainable’ funds would become interesting and would create opportunities 
for ‘green’ investors.  
The conservative, religious, green mix of societal aims would also lead 
to a new moderation or ‘new temperance’.61 In the fields of consumption and 
life style, politics frugality would be stimulated and perhaps even demanded. 
This new moderation is seen in our worries for resource depletion, but also in 
the gradual restraining of activities such as smoking, drinking, and sex.  
It is my expectation that due to the egalitarian nature of the 
presuppositions that underpin precautionary logic, the administration would, 
where possible, refrain from using hard law. It would instead resort to 
providing incentives to acquire the behaviour it desires from the public. 
Incentives would be the carrot and uncertainty and belief in human frailty 
might be the stick. By this I mean that the government would actively point out 
the fragile nature of our bodies and our ecosystems and the insecurity that 
accompanies our day-to-day living in order to have people refrain from 
behaviour that is considered risky.    
John Gray points out that millenarian political systems – like Marxism 
and Nazism – are always prone to violence. I have argued thus far that 
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precautionary logic is a set of presuppositions that points towards similar 
millenarian green politics. Yet, I do not think it would be associated with such 
crude violence as Gray shows is inherent in fascism or communism. The 
political system precautionary logic favours would be ecologism, in which 
wholesale violence threatens to upset the natural balance, be it violence against 
nature or against humans. That does not mean that this politics might not be 
repressive. It would use moderation as repression, a gentle tweaking of our 
daily activities via warning systems, labels, consumer awareness through 
science, education constant monitoring and identification, and instilling a 
forward-looking attitude in humans. It would be a non-liberal policy, because 
we no longer tolerate allowing the preferences of the few to dominate the 
many.  
What follows is a reresponsabilisation of ordinary people. We see this 
reflected in the obesity debate for instance and in the illusion that our activities 
will mean something for our environment as a whole.62 In criminal politics it 
can be foreseen that considerably more behaviour will be criminalised, but that 
the sanction will have the same moderating character. This will entail a 
reduction in generic prison sentences but an increase in measures that impinge 
upon the lives of the convicted: for instance, by using restraining orders or by 
means of tailored prohibitions that are designed to stop the target from 
displaying unwanted behaviour. 
Our policies will also become more forward looking. There will be 
more scope to make early interventions in processes without much need for 
scientific justification. Instead, policy will revolve around ethics. This ethos 
will be one of harmony in which there will be little room to deviate from the 
norm. Deviations will not necessarily be punished, but moderated. They will be 
filtered out, tweaked, and blunted by early intervention, education in the spirit 
of harmony, tailor-made orders, and the mobilisation of public consciousness 
and awareness.  
10 Conclusion 
Precautionary logic is a stronger term than, say, precautionary discourse. A 
logic system implies that a certain way of reasoning has become fixed. It has 
found its place and can now act as an arbiter of truth. When precautionary logic 
is dominant in a certain domain, arguments for precautionary measures are 
considered valid herein. 
Precautionary logic concerns not the form of an argument but the 
content. The content of the argument is made plausible by a set of absolute 
presuppositions implied in the argument. These presuppositions are axioms that 
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are considered true and do not need to become the subject of further 
questioning or research. In this article, a number of such presuppositions have 
been mapped out.   
Firstly, humans and their environment are vulnerable. This is a given. 
Almost all precautionary arguments will display this presumption of 
vulnerability. Secondly, we are faced with a world of uncertainty. Science 
cannot help us cope with the risks and does not make weighing risk possible. 
Science and technology are part of the problem and not of its solution. The 
actions of humankind in general should be viewed with suspicion, since they 
may already have caused a disharmony in our ecosystems that might lead to 
catastrophe. At this point though, sometimes referred to as the time of reflexive 
modernisation, humankind has come to realise the wisdom of foresight.63 If 
science, production, and consumption were to transform in the spirit of 
foresight, we might achieve a harmonious society, especially in the interest of 
generations to come. Vulnerability, uncertainty, limited science, imminent 
catastrophe, and salvation by foresight and a perspective of harmony are 
absolute presuppositions of precautionary logic. In domains where 
precautionary logic is a dominant line of reasoning, only discourses that affirm 
these presuppositions would be condoned. Other discourses would be 
marginalised.  
These presuppositions represent a turn from traditional Enlightenment 
notions such as the autonomous subject, the benefits of culture over nature, and 
an era of progress under the aegis of science. However, they do not represent a 
turn from Western thought in general. They hearken back to an older set of 
presuppositions current in early Christian and mediaeval philosophy and 
theology. These presuppositions underpin an apocalyptic and eschatological 
vision that represents a secularised religion in which nature has taken over at 
least some of the duties of God. This new religious fervour will have 
consequences for politics, which may see the rise of a new ethical revival. This 
politics will not treat the individual subject as its main locus of concern. Instead 
it will focus on fostering harmonious relations within the collective. 
It is ironic that a thinker who informed a great deal of ecological 
thinking, Martin Heidegger, lamented in the 1970s that ‘only a God could save 
us’.64 Perhaps his prophecy will be fulfilled.      
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